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IN SEARCH OF THE VANISHING FOREIGN
TAX CREDIT: IMPLICATIONS OF
REVENUE RULING 76-508*
The United States taxes all domestic and foreign income of its citizens,
domestic corporations, and resident aliens.' Many foreign countries also
tax foreign income of U.S. domestic corporations, citizens, and resident
aliens,2 raising the possibility that foreign income of U.S. domestic corpora-
tions might be taxed twice. Certain sections of the Internal Revenue
Code,3 collectively called the foreign tax credit, prevent this potential
double taxation4 by providing a credit against U.S. income tax liability for
certain foreign taxes paid on foreign source income.
The Internal Revenue Service has recently begun to scrutinize this
credit provision and has attempted to restrict the availability of the credit.5
* This Note was selected by the Cornell Law School faculty International Legal Studies
Committee as co-recipient of the 1978 Henry White Edgerton Prize in International Affairs.
1. I.R.C. § 61(a) defines gross income as "all income from whatever source derived."
See Jenks, Taxation of Foreign Income, 42 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 537, 539 (1974).
2. E. OWENS & G. BALL, THE INDIRECr CREDIT 3 (1975).
3. I.R.C. §§ 901-908. Domestic corporations, citizens, and resident aliens may credit
foreign income taxes paid or accrued. Id. § 901(a)-(b). Taxpayers may also credit foreign
"war profits and excess profits taxes paid or accrued." Id. Few cases discuss the qualification
of these taxes. See E. OWENS, THE FOREIGN TAX CREDrr 69 (1961). Domestic corporations
owning 10% or more of the voting stock of a foreign corporation may credit part of the foreign
company's income tax payments or accruals. I.R.C. § 902(a). For a detailed discussion of the
rules of application of this "indirect credit," see E. OWENS & G. BALL, supra note 2, at 3-11.
See also Rev. Rul. 74-158, 1974-1 C.B. 182. Section 903 provides a credit for payment or
accrual of a foreign tax that is "in lieu" of income tax. When Congress added this section in
1942, it intended to enlarge the foreign tax credit provisions to include not only income taxes
but other foreign taxes that substitute for income taxes. Note, The Foreign Tax Credit for
American Oil Contractors in Indonesia: An Allocation Approach, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 307,
312-13 (1977). Section 903's rationale, like that of§ 901, is the prevention of double taxation.
Equitable Life Assurance Soe'y v. United States, 366 F.2d 967, 974 (Ct. CL 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1021 (1967). Each of these credits is subject to a ceiling amount under § 904. For a
discussion of these limitations, see M. MOORE & R. BAGLEY, U.S. TAX AsPECTS OF DOING
BusINEss ABROAD 94-99 (1978). The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §§ 1031-
1037, 90 Stat. 1525 (1976), made significant changes in these rules. See Steinberg & Sisson,
Foreign Tax Credit: How Taxpayers are Affected by New Rules Under TRA 1976, 46 J. TAX.
250 (1977); Note, supra.
4. The rationale for the credit was to eliminate the economic disincentive resulting from
double taxation of foreign source income of American corporations. Burnet v. Chicago Por-
trait Co., 285 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1932).
5. The Service, for example, has severely limited the definition of § 901 "income." See
Rev. RuL 78-61, 1978-8 I.R.B. 11; Rev. RuL 78-62, 1978-8 I.R.B. 16; Rev. RuL 78-63, 1978-8
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The Service has developed a novel theory that predicates the availability of
the credit for foreign tax payments upon stringent procedural requirements.
This theory, announced in Revenue Ruling 76-508,6 requires that under
certain circumstances taxpayers must contest in the foreign country their
liability for foreign taxes and must seek review under any available "com-
petent authority" provisions.7 Failure to contest or seek review can result
in loss of the credit for the foreign tax payment. Revenue Ruling 76-508
will at best cause substantial uncertainty concerning the availability of for-
eign tax credits, and may at worst deny credits to many taxpayers by creat-
ing unrealistic procedural requirements. The motivation for the ruling is
unclear,8 but the effect could be devastating for all U.S. foreign investment.
This Note will describe Revenue Ruling 76-508 and the theory it apparently
announces, explore the reach of the ruling, analyze the ruling's basis in law
and policy, and suggest a narrowing interpretation of the ruling consistent
with Code and policy considerations.
I
CRITERIA FOR FOREIGN TAX CREDITS
In the past, to be eligible for a foreign tax credit, a foreign tax payment
has had to meet two requirements. 9 First, the payment to a government
must be a "tax": 10 a governmental levy for the public benefit." Second,
I.R.B. 18. The Service requires that a foreign tax must meet the following requirements in
order to be considered an "income tax": (1) gain on which the foreign tax is levied must be
"realized" in the American sense of the word; (2) the purpose and operation of the foreign tax
must be to reach net gain; and (3) the tax must be imposed on receipt of income. Rev. Rul.
78-61, 1978-8 I.R.B. 11, 13-14.
The IRS has also taken a narrow view of the 10-year statute of limitations for amending
foreign tax credits. In Rev. Rul. 77-487, the taxpayer contested a tax levy in 1962 and in 1972
paid the contested amount to the foreign government. The IRS ruled that the taxpayer's at-
tempt to carryover the adjustment to amend his 1963 credit was barred by the 10-year statute
of limitations, I.R.C. § 651 l(d)(3)(A), counting 1962 as the first year. Rev. Rul. 77-487, 1977-
52 I.R.B. 21. This denial seems unreasonable in light of the taxpayer's good faith contest and
the alteration of the 1963 rather than the 1962 return.
6. 1976-2 C.B. 225, 226.
7. Many tax treaties between the United States and foreign countries establish a griev-
ance procedure for taxpayers to complain about excessive or double taxation in the contracting
countries. The "competent authority" is the name given to officials of each contracting coun-
try who consult with each other to resolve such taxpayer complaints. See notes 47-48 infra
and accompanying text.
8. See note 70 infra and accompanying text.
9. The textual discussion of the requirements for foreign tax credits refers only to those
requirements for § 901 direct credits and § 902 indirect credits that are relevant to this Note's
analysis. The other requirements for and limitations on the credit, such as § 904's limitation
on the total amount of foreign tax credits available in any given year, are beyond the scope of
the Note.
10. I.R.C. § 901 states in part:
(a) IT]he tax imposed by this chapter shall... be credited with the amounts pro-
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the payment must be in satisfaction of an "income" tax12 obligation. 13
With one important exception,14 Revenue Ruling 76-508 appears substan-
vided in the applicable paragraph of subsection (b) plus, in the case of a corporation,
the taxes deemed to have been paid under [section] 902 ....
(b) [including]
(1) In the case of a citizen of the United States and of a domestic corporation,
the amount of any income, war profits, and excess profits taxes paid or accrued
during the taxable year to any foreign country ....
11. Although the only decision defining "tax" for the purpose of the foreign tax credit has
been declared obsolete, the language defining tax is still usefuk
The word "taxes," in its most enlarged sense, embraces all the regular impositions
made by government upon the person, property, privileges, occupations, and enjoy-
ments of the people for the purpose of raising public revenue .... Fundamentally, a
tax is an exaction imposed by a government upon its peopleforpublicpurposes.
I.T. 3768, 1945 C.B. 204, 205, declared obsolete in Rev. Rul. 70-293, 1970-1 C.B. 282, 283.
A payment to a government, although termed a "tax," may be a loan. Rev. Rul. 67-187,
1967-1 C.B. 185. In denying a credit, the ruling stated that the "Special Refundable Tax [was]
in the nature of a compulsory loan, repayable with interest within a specified time. Refund of
the tax is essentially the repayment of a loan. ... Id. at 185. See Rev. Rul. 60-58, 1960-1
C.B. 274 (denying a credit for a "tax" that was really a compulsory refundable loan); Rev. Rul.
59-70, 1959-1 C.B. 186 (denial where tax was to be repaid with interest in six years).
Similarly, a levy for the purpose of regulation is not a tax. See United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1 (1936) (processing "tax" imposed to defray administrative cost of regulation and pay-
ment to benefit certain farmers was not a tax); Baily v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20
(1922) (levy designated a tax was not a tax, since the exaction was a penalty for violation of
regulations).
12. War and excess profits taxes are eligible as well. See note 3 supra.
13. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. United States, 392 F.2d 592, 597 (Ct. Cl. 1968); New York &
Honduras Rosario Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 745, 747 (2d Cir. 1948). The
United States Supreme Court, in dictum, has stated:
Section 131 [I.R.C. §§ 901-905] does not say that the meaning of its words is to be
determined by foreign taxing statutes and decisions, and there is nothing in its lan-
guage to suggest that in allowing the credit for foreign tax payments, a shifting stan-
dard was adopted by reference to foreign characterizations and classifications of tax
legislation. The phrase "income taxes paid," as used in our own revenue laws, has for
most practical purposes a well understood meaning to be derived from an examination
of the statutes which provide for the laying and collection of income taxes. It is that
meaning which must be attributed to it as used in § 131.
Biddle v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1938).
A tax based upon gross profits is an "income tax" if levied on "income," computed in such a
manner that taxpayers will not have to pay it when they have no net gain. Bank of America
Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. United States, 459 F.2d 513, 524 (Ct. Cl. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 949 (1973). On the other hand, a tax based solely upon the imputed rental value of land
is not an income tax, since the U.S. concept of income does not include imputed value of land.
F.W. Woolworth Co. v. United States, 91 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1937), rev'g and remanding 15 F.
Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1936), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 768 (1938).
14. Although in nearly all situations Rev. RuL 76-508 restricts the availability of a foreign
tax credit, the ruling appears to broaden that availability in a § 482 setting. For a discussion
of I.R.C. § 482, see note 15 infra. Prior to Rev. Rul. 76-508, two revenue rulings denied at least
direct credits for all foreign tax payments that were based upon income subsequently allocated
under § 482 unless the taxpayer corporation could establish that it would still have incurred
the foreign tax liability even if it had dealt with the related entity at arm's length.
Revenue Ruling 72-370, 1972-2 C.B. 437, involved a § 482 allocation of income from S, a
wholly owned foreign subsidiary, to M, the U.S. parent. Prior to the allocation S had made
1979]
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tially to restrict the eligibility of foreign tax payments for the foreign tax
credit.
The ruling appears to add a new requirement that the taxpayer seeking
a foreign tax credit must establish foreign tax liability by both contesting
the payment in the foreign country and seeking competent authority assist-
ance. The ruling involved a section 48215 allocation of income from a for-
eign subsidiary to a U.S. parent corporation. Neither the parent nor the
subsidiary attempted to obtain a refund of the taxes attributable to the allo-
cated income, and the ruling concluded 16 that in order to receive a foreign
tax credit, the subsidiary must exhaust "all effective and practicable admin-
foreign tax payments computed from the income subsequently allocated to M. If the transac-
tion that gave rise to the allocation had been conducted at arm's length, neither M nor S would
have incurred any foreign tax liability. Under these facts, the Service denied M's claim of a
direct credit for the foreign tax payments. In Rev. Rul. 72-371, 1972-2 C.B. 438, M, a U.S.
parent, owned 55% of subsidiary P incorporated in foreign country X and 100% of subsidiary S
incorporated in foreign country Z. P paid $100 royalties to S but under the laws of Z had to
withhold a $15 tax. The Service allocated the $100 royalty income to M under § 482. If the
royalty had originally been paid to M, P would have withheld a $10 tax instead of the $15.
Under these facts, the Service held that M was entitled to a foreign tax credit in the amount of
$10.
The reasoning behind these two rulings appears to be that foreign tax payments based upon
income that is subsequently allocated under § 482 will be eligible for a credit only to the extent
that the transactions, as recast by the Service, would create foreign tax liability. Although
these two rulings deal only with direct credits under § 901, the rationale would seem to apply
with equal force to the § 902 indirect credit. E. OWENS & G. BALL, supra note 2, at 193-94.
Viewed from this perspective, Rev. Rul. 76-508 enlarges the availability of the credit by al-
lowing certain foreign tax payments to be creditable even though no foreign tax liability would
have occurred if the transaction had been conducted in an arm's length manner.
15. I.R.C. § 482 states in relevant part:
In any case of two or more. . . businesses.., owned or controlled directly or indi-
rectly by the same interests, the Secretary may. . . allocate gross income, deductions,
credits, or allowances between or among such... businesses, if he determines that
such . . . allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to
reflect the income of any such... businesses.
The purpose of § 482 is "to place a controlled taxpayer on a tax parity with an uncontrolled
taxpayer"--that is, to ensure that entities under common control deal with one another at
prices reflecting the arm's length prices independent entities would charge. Treas. Reg. §
1.482-1(b)(1) (1962). Without this threat of allocation by the Secretary, entities under com-
mon control could apportion income so as to minimize or eliminate taxation. See Commis-
sioner v. First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., 405 U.S. 394 (1972).
16. If a taxpayer is put on notice, whether by a proposed adjustment by the Service
under section 482 of the Code or otherwise, of the possibility of securing a refund or
reduction of foreign income tax liability but fails to pursue its remedies to secure such an
adjustment the amounts as to which an adjustment was not sought may be contributions
to the foreign government ....
When as in the instant case income is allocated to a domestic corporation from its
foreign subsidiary under section 482 of the Code, a presumption arises that the subsidiary
has made a contribution to the foreign government. This presumption will be rebutted if
the subsidiary exhausts all effective and practicable administrative remedies in seeking a
refund of its foreign income tax liability and if the domestic parent exhausts its rights
under the competent authority procedure ....
Rev. Rul 76-508, 1976-2 C.B. 225, 226 (citations omitted).
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istrative remedies" for obtaining a refund in the foreign country, and the
parent must exhaust its rights under the competent authority procedure.17
Because the company failed to follow these procedures, the IRS denied a
credit for the foreign tax payments attributable to the allocated income.18
The Service argued that the allocation of the foreign subsidiary's income to
the domestic parent under section 482 caused the tax previously paid on
that income by the subsidiary to the foreign government to become a "con-
tribution," rather than a tax, for the purposes of section 902.19 Since only
"tax" payments are eligible for a foreign tax credit, the characterization of
the payment as a "contribution" removed its eligibility for a credit. Under
the ruling, the taxpayer could reinstate the payment's status as a "tax" and
thereby reestablish its eligibility for a foreign tax credit, if the subsidiary
exhausted all effective and practicable administrative remedies and the par-
ent exhausted its remedies under the competent authority.
Although Revenue Ruling 76-508 involved a section 482 allocation, the
contribution presumption and the possible procedural rebuttals announced
therein appear to be equally applicable to every taxpayer claiming a foreign
tax credit. The ruling does not expressly limit the operation of the pre-
sumption to reallocations of income,20 and uses broad language to an-
nounce the presumption. In addition, the Service's second and at present
last word in this area,21 Revenue Ruling 77-267,22 points to wide applica-
tion of the principle. There a foreign branch of a domestic corporation,
knowing that a similarly situated taxpayer had obtained a refund, peti-
tioned the foreign administrative agency for a refund and obtained a com-
promise settlement.3 The Service explicitly analyzed these facts in light of
Revenue Ruling 76-508.24 Apparently the taxpayer's notice of a similarly
17. For a discussion of competent authority, see notes 47-48 infra and accompanying text.
18. Rev. RuL 76-508, 1976-2 C.B. 225, 226.
19. Id See note 16 supra; notes 47-48 infra and accompanying text.
20. The ruling states that notice of the possibility of a tax reduction or refund may occur
by a "proposed adjustment" under § 482 "or otherwise." Rev. Rul. 76-508, 1976-2 C.B. 225,
226.
21. Very recently, the IRS has relied upon Rev. Rul. 76-508 in a letter ruling. Letter Rul.
No. 7838063, [1978] IRS LETrER RULING REP. (CCH) (June 22, 1978). This letter ruling
confirms that the application of the principles of Rev. Rul. 76-508 will not be limited to § 482
allocations. In the letter ruling, P, a domestic corporation, liquidated its wholly owned sub-
sidiary, S, located in the Virgin Islands. The Virgin Islands tax authorities issued to S a notice
of intent to assess a 30% withholding tax on certain liquidation distributions by S. S contested
this tax but did not prevail. The Service held that the taxpayer had exhausted all effective and
practicable administrative remedies in the foreign country. In addition, since the United
States and the Virgin Islands have no competent authority procedures, the Service held that
the taxpayer had exhausted all remedies in this regard. Thus, P could claim a foreign tax
credit for the withholding tax it paid.
22. Rev. RuL 77-267, 1977-31 I.R.B. 16.
23. Id. at 16-17.
24. Id. at 17.
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situated taxpayer's refund raised the contribution presumption.25 But the
IRS concluded that the taxpayer had successfully rebutted the presumption
by petitioning the foreign government and obtaining a compromise settle-
ment, thereby exhausting "in good faith" all effective and practicable ad-
ministrative remedies.26
Thus, the contribution presumption may be widely applicable, since
two disparate events-a section 482 allocation and notice of another's suc-
cessful refund-both raised the contribution presumption. The description
of the principle is broad enough to encompass every payment of foreign
taxes for which a taxpayer claims credit.27 In addition, the ruling may
have retrospective applicability, affecting payments made even before it was
issued.28 The next section will explore the possible reach of the contribu-
tion presumption and the procedural burdens involved in rebutting the pre-
sumption.
II
POSSIBLE REACH OF REVENUE RULING 76-508
Although the IRS will not necessarily press the language of Revenue
Ruling 76-508 to its limits, the potential scope of the ruling plays an impor-
tant part in assessing its effect on the foreign tax credit. In addition, the
rule creates a good deal of uncertainty, underscoring the disadvantages of
setting tax policy through the revenue ruling process.
A. CONTRIBUTION PREsuMPrION
Revenue Ruling 76-508 states:
If a taxpayer is put on notice, whether by a proposed adjustment by the Serv-
ice under section 482 of the Code or otherwise, of the possibility of securing a
25. Although the ruling never expressly held that the contribution presumption was
raised, it would not have needed to find that all effective administrative remedies had been
exhausted if no presumption had been raised.
26. [Slince X [the taxpayer] in the instant case has, in good faith, exhausted all effective
and practicable administrative remedies in seeking refund or adjustment of its foreign
income tax liability and since the monetary settlement reached is comparable to a refund
obtained in good faith by a similarly situated taxpayer, the portion of the United King-
dom taxes claimed but not returned, if the monetary settlement is accepted by X, will
constitute creditable taxes for purposes of section 901(b) of the Code, subject to applicable
limits.
Rev. Rul. 77-267, 1977-31 I.R.B. 16, 17.
27. The broad language of the ruling could encompass even individual taxpayers. Rev.
Rul. 76-508, 1976-2 C.B. 225.
28. In general, revenue rulings apply both retrospectively and prospectively unless the
Service states otherwise. Rev. Proc. 72-1, § 6.01(3), 1972-1 C.B. 693. Nevertheless a recent
Tax Court case stated that Rev. Rul. 76-508 had only prospective application. Schering Corp.
v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. No. 46, [1978] TAx. CT. REP. (CCH) 1 34,929, at 2250 n.17.
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refund or reduction of foreign income tax liability ... the amounts as to
which an adjustment was not sought may be contributions to the foreign
government. 29
Thus, there must be a possibility of foreign tax refund or reduction in for-
eign tax liability, and the taxpayer must be on notice of this possibility. If
both of these conditions occur, the Service may raise the contribution pre-
sumption. This formulation of the conditions for raising the presumption
permits the Service to raise it for virtually every payment of foreign income
taxes.
. Possibility of Tax Refund or Reduction
The first requirement of the contribution presumption-"possibility of
refund or reduction in tax"--provides no limitation to the applicability of
the presumption, because for every foreign tax payment there is some possi-
bility of securing a reduction or refund.30 For example, every taxpayer's
decision to include an item in gross income or exclude an item from a de-
duction raises the "possibility" of a tax refund, since there is rarely one
clear result from applying substantive tax law to a specific set of facts.
Moreover, the use of the term "reduction of tax liability" in addition to
"refund of tax liability" may indicate that the taxpayer must carefully plan
in advance to utilize all possibilities of minimizing taxes.31 Failure to
shape the transaction in the most favorable tax posture could create the
"possibility of a reduction of tax liability," even though no refund after the
fact would be available.32 Thus, to avoid raising the contribution pre-
sumption, the taxpayer may not only have to file a flawless yearly tax re-
turn, but may also have to structure transactions carefully in advance to
minimize future tax liability.3 3 Even a less extreme view would indicate
29. Rev. RuL 76-508, 1976-2 C.B. 225, 226. See Rev. Rul. 77-267, 1977-31 I.R.B. 16, 17.
30. Possibility is "the character, condition, or fact of being possible," which is defined as
"what may be done, occur, be conceived, or be attained .. " WEBSTER'S TmiR NEw IN-
TERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1771 (1961). One court has defined possibility as "capable of ex-
isting or happening, feasible. The word does not mean probability, but denotes extreme
improbability without excluding the idea of feasibility." Reisdorf v. Mayor, 114 NJ. Super.
562, 570, 227 A.2d 554, 559 (1971). See also Bump v. Da, 26 Wis. 2d 607, 613, 133 N.W.2d
295, 299 (1965).
31. In the alternative the word "reduction" may merely take into account foreign tax cred-
its based upon accruals of foreign tax liability rather than upon actual payments thereof. In
other words, a taxpayer who has accrued a foreign tax liability but who has not paid the
liability could not seek a "refund" until after payment is made.
32. This tax planning requirement lacks support in law and policy. See note 64 infra.
33. The phrase "possibility of reduction in tax liability" also may require the taxpayer to
choose the tax deduction that minimizes the foreign tax payment even if he would have a
choice of forms of tax deductions under the foreign law. For example, the English tax statutes
allow the taxpayer to choose between the equivalent of straight-line depreciation or acceler-
ated depreciation deductions for certain types of tangible assets. Finance Act, 1971, c. 68, §§
41(1), 41(3), at 1229-30. Even though either form of deduction is available, Rev. Rul. 76-508
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that the taxpayer must be alert to every chance, however slim, of securing
even the smallest refund. This could hold true regardless of the cost of
seeking such a refund.
2. Notice
The ruling's notice requirement may likewise do little to narrow the
scope of the presumption. Because courts have often construed "notice" to
include "constructive notice,"134 any event that creates the possibility of a
tax refund or reduction may also put the taxpayer on "notice," whether or
not the taxpayer actually knew of the possibility. In terms of Revenue Rul-
ing 76-508, if a taxpayer does not deduct a legally deductible expense, there
is a possibility of a tax reduction or refund. If the notice requirement is
met by constructive notice, the mere existence of such a possibility may
satisfy the notice requirement and raise the contribution presumption. Al-
though the Service may not interpret the possibility and notice conditions in
such a broad manner, the problems of uncertainty and the potentially all-
inclusive standard will remain until the Service refines the criteria for the
invocation of the contribution presumption.
The ruling indicates that the Service will not raise the presumption in
every case in which the two conditions occur. But its statement that the
two conditions "may" raise the presumption3s gives no insight as to what
factors will dissuade the Service from doing so. Although the use of the
word "may" appears to be a safety valve to mitigate the application of the
presumption, it only adds to the taxpayer's uncertainty. Since virtually
every tax payment could meet the possibility and notice conditions, the
Service could raise the contribution presumption to attack almost any for-
eign tax payment. Under Revenue Ruling 76-508's standard, a taxpayer
attempting to remain eligible for the foreign tax credit has no palatable
choices. He can assume that the presumption will be raised in every case
and seek the procedural remedies that rebut the presumption, regardless of
cost.3 6 Alternatively, he can take his chances by doing nothing and hoping
the Service either does not audit his return or decides not to raise the pre-
sumption.
may force the taxpayer to choose accelerated depreciation since the failure to use this method
could create the possibility of a reduction in foreign tax liability.
1 34. "Constructive notice is information or knowledge of a fact imputed by law to a per-
son, ... because he could have discovered the fact by proper diligence .... BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1210(4th ed. 1968). See Baltimore v. Whittington, 78 Md. 231, 77 A. 984 (1930).
35. Rev. Rul 76-508, 1976-2 C.B. 225, 226.
36. Although the Service has provided no clear guidelines for invoking the presumption, it
appears that the taxpayer involved in a § 482 allocation will automatically be subject to the
contribution presumption.
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B. PROCEDURAL REBUTTALS
Assuming that the IRS raises the contribution presumption, Revenue
Ruling 76-508 states that the taxpayer may rebut the presumption by pursu-
ing its remedies to secure an adjustment of foreign tax liability in two ways.
First, the taxpayer must exhaust "all effective and practicable administra-
tive remedies" in the foreign country. 37 Second, he must pursue relief
through competent authority, if any.3 8 This second avenue, however, does
not appear to be required if foreign administrative proceedings have pro-
duced a satisfactory adjustment. 39
1. Foreign Administrative Remedies
The extent to which the taxpayer must contest his liability in the for-
eign country is almost as uncertain as the circumstances that will raise the
presumption. The Service, however, has limited the requirement to ex-
haustion of administrative-as opposed to legal-relief.4  But within this
limitation, the level of contesting that is required remains unclear. The
ruling states that the taxpayer must exhaust all "effective and practicable
remedies," but attempts to meet these criteria are fraught with' uncertainty.
First, the Service does not define "effective" or "practicable." An "effec-
tive" remedy appears to be one whose outcome may lead to the desired
result.41  Since all administrative remedies, if successful, will reduce tax
liability, the word "effective" seems to provide no assistance in determining
whether exhaustion of administrative remedies has occurred. The word
"practicable" also provides little assistance in limiting the required admin-
istrative steps. Although practicable means capable of being performed, or
feasible,42 and is thus somewhat more limiting than the word "effective,"
37. See note 16 supra.
38. Id. For a discussion of competent authority, see notes 47-48 infra and accompanying
text.
39. In holding that the contribution presumption was rebutted, Rev. Rul. 77-267 did not
require exhaustion of competent authority. Alternatively, it could be argued that resort to
competent authority is required only when the contribution presumption is raised in a § 482
setting. Since Rev. Rul. 77-267 did not involve a § 482 allocation, no resort to competent
authority was required.
40. See note 16 supra.
41. One court has defined "effective" to mean "[piroducing a decided, decisive, or desired
effect." Conroy v. Purcaro, 42 NJ. 120, 124, 199 A.2d 643, 645 (1964) (per curiam). "Effec-
tive" has also been defined as "capable of bringing about an effect: productive of results."
WEBsTER's TeRta NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 724 (1961).
42. See Frey v. Security Ins. Co., 331 F. Supp. 140, 143 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (practicable
means feasible in the circumstances); Miller v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 790, 794-95, 440 P.2d 840,
842-43 (1968)(practicable means possible to practice or perform; capable of being put into
practice, done, or accomplished, feasible). Although in the past some courts stated that "prac-
ticable" was synonomous with "possible," see Miller v. Southern Express Co., 99 S.C. 333, 340,
83 S.E. 449, 451 (1914), most courts now recognize that "practicable" is a more limiting term
than "possible." Miller v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 790, 794-95, 440 P.2d 840, 842-43 (1968). See
1979]
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the application of this definition to specific circumstances does not assist the
taxpayer in determining when he has exhausted his administrative reme-
dies. The taxpayer lacks guidance for interpreting the scope of the possible
rebuttals to the contribution presumption. Once he decides to contest the
foreign tax payment he must either pursue foreign administrative remedies
to the highest level or risk a determination that despite his efforts he did not
pursue them far enough.
Second, the ruling ignores the realities surrounding the foreign tax
credit situation. For example, it is not clear whether the expiration of the
foreign statute of limitations for contesting the foreign tax constitutes ex-
haustion of foreign administrative remedies. 43 In addition, when the U.S.
taxpayer claims an indirect credit44 but does not control the foreign corpo-
ration,45 he may not be able to convince the foreign subsidiary to contest
the foreign tax payment. The ruling provides no guidance as to whether
the controlling shareholders' refusal to contest, in itself, meets the exhaus-
tion standard. 6
2 Competent Authority
In addition to seeking foreign administrative remedies, Revenue Rul-
ing 76-508 requires the taxpayer to pursue his remedies under the compe-
tent authority procedure. Several tax treaties between the United States
and other countries establish this mechanism for resolution of double taxa-
tion issues,47 under which an aggrieved taxpayer can petition his country's
representative for relief 4 8 It is unclear when the taxpayer must petition the
In re Kenilworth Bldg. Corp., 105 F.2d 673, 676 (7th Cir. 1939); Woody v. South Carolina
Power Co., 202 S.C. 73, 81, 24 S.E.2d 121, 124 (1943).
43. See text following note 90 for a suggested solution to this problem.
44. I.R.C. § 902.
45. A U.S. shareholder may own as little as 10% of the foreign corporation and remain
eligible for an indirect credit under I.R.C. § 902. See note 3 supra.
46. See text accompanying note 78 for a suggested solution to this problem.
47. Cole, Competent Authority Procedure: International Tax Counsel gives his views, 35 J.
TAX. 8, 9 (1971).
48. Prior to 1970, although sixteen tax treaties between the United States and foreign gov-
ernments gave the Treasury authority to negotiate with foreign countries over the appropriate
allocation of a taxpayer's income, there was no definite procedure for the presentation of these
claims. Aversa, International Tax Allocations and Treaty Relief Through Competent Authority
Procedures, 19 TAx ExEc. 15, 17 (1966). In 1970 the Service issued Rev. Proc. 70-18, 1970-2
C.B. 493, which prescribed procedures for invoking competent authority assistance when a §
482 allocation occurred between a U.S. taxpayer and a related person subject to the income tax
jurisdiction of a U.S. treaty partner. Rev. Proc. 77-16, 1977-1 C.B. 573, supplements Rev.
Proc. 70-18 by outlining the procedures for requesting competent authority assistance when
nonallocation issues arise. These "issues involve the availability to a United States taxpayer
of credits against foreign tax, exemptions from foreign tax, reduced rates of foreign tax, and
other benefits and safeguards provided under income tax treaties." Id. at 573.
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competent authority if the contribution presumption is raised.49 Although
Revenue Ruling 76-508 states that the taxpayer must exhaust its remedies
under competent authority, in Revenue Ruling 77-267 the taxpayer rebut-
ted the contribution presumption without having resorted to competent au-
thority.5° Like the other facets of Revenue Ruling 76-508, failure to
establish specific guidelines creates needless uncertainty.
III
BASIS IN LAW AND POLICY OF
REVENUE RULING 76-508
Revenue rulings are not law, but rather the Service's interpretation of
what the law is.5 1 Thus, for a theory advanced in a ruling to be valid, it
must have a basis in either law or policy. The Service's theory in Revenue
Ruling 76-508 can be broken down into two parts-a standard and an evi-
dentiary rule. The standard may be stated as follows: the Service may find
that a payment made to a foreign government pursuant to its tax laws is not
a tax if the taxpayer's liability for the tax is less than certain or could have
been reduced. To apply this standard, the Service will draw on all material
information of which the taxpayer had notice either at the time of or after
filing the foreign tax return.5 2 This evidentiary rule has substantial support
in the Code and case law,5 3 but it is more difficult to find support for the
expansive standard announced in the ruling.
A. BASIS IN THE CODE
Although Congress could have expressly required that a taxpayer con-
test uncertain foreign tax liability in order to receive a credit, the Code
contains no such provision. Section 904, which places a ceiling on the
49. Under the revenue procedures, the taxpayer can file his request for assistance as soon
as the issues are sufficiently developed to permit such assistance. Rev. Proc. 70-18, 1970-2
C.B. 493, supplemented by Rev. Proc. 77-16, 1977-1 C.B. 573; see note 48 supra.
50. See note 39 supra, note 90 infra.
51. Rev. Proc. 72-1, 1972-1 C.B. 693, 694.
52. Although the Service does not expressly state this evidentiary rule, it can be gleaned
from the facts of both Rev. Rul. 76-508 and Rev. Rul. 77-267. In both cases, the filing of the
tax returns had occurred prior to the "notice" of a possible tax refund.
53. In tax law, the signing of the tax return does not necessarily mark the end of the
inquiry as to eligibility for the foreign tax credit. For example, the Code expressly provides
for the readjustment of a credit when subsequent events alter the amount of the credit. I.R.C.
§ 905(c). Similarly, the courts have held that the refund of a foreign tax relates back and
alters the credit originally taken for the tax. United States v. Campbell, 351 F.2d 336 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 907 (1966). See Cuba R.R. Co. v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 182
(S.D.N.Y. 1954)(credit for contested tax payment, once resolved, relates back to year in which
tax wquld have been paid if there had been no contest); Rev. RuL 58-55, 1958-1 C.B. 266
(citing Cuba ARR. with approval and reasoning that credits should be matched with associated
income in order to avoid double taxation).
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amount of credit available, is the only limitation on the eligibility of foreign
income tax payments. 54 The ruling, by further limiting the availability of
the credit, appears to be inconsistent with the congressional intent embod-
ied in section 904. Furthermore, the ruling does not mesh with the section
905 requirement that credits only be redetermined when a taxpayer receives
a refund of foreign tax payments. 55 Since the Code lacks any language
concerning "possible" or "potential" refunds, the mere possibility of a re-
fund should not affect the eligibility of a foreign tax payment for a credit.
Nor does the legislative history of the foreign tax credit provide sup-
port for the ruling. The legislative intent behind the foreign tax credit was
the elimination of double taxation and its adverse affect upon foreign in-
vestment.5 6 Revenue Ruling 76-508, by creating the possibility of double
taxation,57 establishes an impediment to foreign investment and under-
mines this legislative intent. In sum, the relevant Code sections and their
legislative history provide no support for the ruling's test and, if anything,
rebut it.58
Although there is no relevant case law interpreting the foreign tax
credit provisions, courts have developed a standard for determining when
tax payments to state governments are ineligible for a federal tax deduction.
The federal tax deduction for a state tax payment59 has been denied only if
54. I.R.C. § 904; see note 3 supra. Several courts have characterized § 904 as the only
limit on the eligibility of a foreign tax payment. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. United States,
375 F.2d 835 (Ct. CL 1967); Woodmansee v. Commissioner, 388 F. Supp. 36 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
See also Rev. Rul. 54-15, 1954-1 C.B. 129.
55. I.LC. § 905(c). "If accrued taxes when paid differ from the amounts claimed as cred-
its by the taxpayer, or if any tax paid is refunded in whole or in part, the taxpayer shall notify
the Secretary or his delegate, who shall redetermine the amount of the tax for the year or years
affected." Id.
56. The congressional purpose in enacting the foreign tax credit was to relieve domestic
taxpayers from the severe burden of double taxation. "With the corresponding high rates
imposed by certain foreign countries the taxes levied in such countries in addition to the taxes
levied in the United States upon citizens of the United States place a very severe burden upon
such citizens." H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1918). See also Burnet v. Chi-
cago Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1 (1932).
57. In Rev. Rul. 76-508, the foreign subsidiary has paid a foreign tax on the income allo-
cated to the domestic parent. The parent will also be required to pay a U.S. tax on the income
if the procedural remedies are not exhausted.
58. The ruling, however, may be justified insofar as it applies to a § 482 allocation. If the
domestic parent automatically receives a credit for the foreign taxes paid by the foreign subsid-
iary on the income subsequently allocated to the domestic parent, there would be absolutely no
penalty for the parent's failure to conduct the transaction at arm's length. See E. OWENS & G.
BALL, supra note 2, at 189-94. Rev. Rul. 76-508 can be justified on the ground that it provides
a policing function for § 482. For a discussion of the effect of a § 482 allocation on foreign tax
credits, see note 14 supra.
59. I.R.C. § 164(a) states in part: "[Tihe following taxes shall be allowed as a deduction
for the taxable year within which paid or accrued: . . . .(3) State and local, and foreign,
income. . . taxes."
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the taxpayer was under no actual or apparent liability6° at the time the
taxpayer made it.61 This standard-no actual or apparent liability--differs
significantly from Revenue Ruling 76-508's test for denying a credit for for-
eign tax payments: liability that is less than certain or could have been re-
duced. This state tax deduction standard, like the Code and legislative
intent discussed above, does not provide support for the Revenue Ruling
76-508 standard. Moreover, unless the state tax deduction can be distin-
guished from the foreign tax credit, it undermines the validity of the rul-
ing's standard.
B. BASIS IN POLICY
If the Revenue Ruling 76-508 standard is to be more stringent than the
domestic tax deduction standard, the foreign tax credit must be distin-
guished from the domestic tax deduction. Two policy rationales distin-
guish the foreign tax credit and provide the only basis for a more stringent
foreign tax credit standard. They do not, however, support the extreme
standard of Revenue Ruling 76-508.
The first policy justification turns on the geographic location of the tax
payment. A state tax payment, even though deducted from federal tax lia-
bility, remains within the U.S. economy for the benefit and use of the
American people. On the other hand, a foreign tax payment neither enters
the domestic economy nor benefits U.S. residents. The fiscal policy of re-
taining money within the United States distinguishes foreign from domestic
60. See Kenyon Instrument Co. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 732 (1951)(denying deduction
for overpayment of taxes when taxpayer knew at time of filing his federal return that he was
not liable for the state tax); Hart Furniture Co. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 1103 (1949), rev'don
other grounds, 188 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1951) (taxpayer not entitled to deduct under § 164 any
portion of excise tax overpaid through taxpayer's error, because taxpayer must be under actual
or apparent obligation for the payment at time it is made in order for it to be deductible);
Cooperstown Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1944)(denying tax payment deduc-
tion where payment indisputably erroneous). See also Baltimore Transfer Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 8 T.C. 1, 7 (1947)(allowing deduction for tax payment later refunded and distinguishing
Cooperstown on ground that taxpayer in Baltimore Transfer acted in response to "practical
compulsion and prima facie validity which we believe the business man may properly attribute
to an administrative notification" of taxes due).
61. Estate of Frank Cohen, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1221 (1970), held that the payment of state
taxes was a valid federal deduction so long as the taxpayer made the payment in good faith.
The fact that the taxpayer's liability was later determined to be far less than the payment did
not invalidate the deduction. See Taylor Instrument Cos. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 388
(1950)(allowing tax payment deduction, even though reduction could occur in subsequent
years because of ongoing renegotiations of taxable income); Estate of Lowenstein v. Commis-
sioner, 12 T.C. 694 (1949), aftdsub nom. First Nat'l Bank of Mobile v. Commissioner, 183
F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 911 (1951)(a good faith payment of taxes for
what was then thought to be owed will not be disturbed by later determination that less was
owed).
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tax payments and supports a more stringent standard for establishing the
validity of foreign tax payments.
The second policy rationale differentiates foreign tax credits and state
tax deductions on the ground that credits are inherently different from de-
ductions. Whereas a creditable expenditure will not cost the taxpayer any
after-tax dollars, an expenditure for which only a tax deduction is available
will always cost after-tax dollars. The taxpayer has no incentive to mini-
mize foreign tax payments that are creditable against federal tax liability.
In fact, the taxpayer has a disincentive to spend money on such activities
since it will cost him money to prepare tax returns carefully or to contest
liability, but he will obtain no commensurate gain. Thus, the Service may
be justified in imposing a stricter standard of eligibility for the foreign tax
credit in order to assure accurate payments.
Although these two policy considerations support a stricter eligibility
standard for the foreign tax credit,62 they do not justify the possibility that
Revenue Ruling 76-508 requires a taxpayer to contest at least some part of
every foreign tax payment in order to be eligible for a foreign tax credit.
Nor do they support a requirement that a taxpayer must engage in tax plan-
ning63 to structure a transaction so as to reduce the foreign tax liability
below what it otherwise would be.64
62. One could argue that these two policies do not provide an adequate basis for the Rev.
RuL 76-508 standard. Congress made the decision to allow credits for foreign tax payments in
1918. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, §§ 222, 238, 240(c), 40 Stat. 1057 (1919). At that time, as
now, there was no incentive to contest foreign tax payments when a credit was available, and
the potential effect upon the U.S. Treasury was the same. Nevertheless, Congress has repeat-
edly reenacted the credit provision without distinguishing between possible and actual refunds.
If the credit's disincentive now appears to have an unacceptably adverse effect, Congress, not
the Service, should repeal or amend it. For a discussion and listing of the various reenact-
ments of the foreign tax credit, see E. OwENs, supra note 3, at 20-21.
63. See text accompanying notes 31-33 supra.
64. Any attempt by the Service to require tax planning would also be inconsistent with
Gulf-Puerto Rico Lines, Inc. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 644 (1974). In this case, the Tax Court
held that the Service could not require a taxpayer to reduce his foreign tax liability when the
taxpayer could elect either to pay Puerto Rican taxes and credit the sums on his U.S. tax
return, or to pay U.S. taxes and credit the sums on his Puerto Rican tax returns.
The fact that petitioner could have availed itself more fully of a provision (for a credit)
of the Puerto Rico income tax laws to eliminate completely any burden of that coun-
try's income tax on United States source income is not a proper concern of the United
States taxing authorities. The statute does not purport to authorize the respondent to
plumb for the reason that the requisite "connection" exists .... Section 164(a)(3)
refers only to foreign income taxes paid or accrued during the taxable year. Such
language precludes a further determination in this instance that the taxes in question
need not have been paid.
Id. at 650-51. Similarly, any attempt by the Service to force taxpayers to choose a deduction
that minimizes the present foreign tax liability-such as choosing accelerated over straight-line
depreciation-when two or more alternative deductions are reasonable, see note 32 supra,
would also be inconsistent with Gulf-Puerto Atco Lines.
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IV
SUGGESTED APPROACH
The uncertainty and legal infirmity generated by Revenue Ruling 76-
508 indicate that the Service should revoke the ruling and promulgate regu-
lations that provide guidelines for the taxpayer's decision as to when he
must utilize procedural rebuttals to the contribution presumption. Use of
the Service's rulemaking power 65 would have several advantages. First, it
is legislative in nature and is thus appropriate for resolving a conflict among
policy alternatives. 66 Second, the rulemaking procedure provides a forum
for the presentation of diverse solutions by all interested parties,67 which
will increase the chance of finding the best resolution of the problem.
Third, use of this more formal process will force the IRS to be more definite
and specific in its resolution of the problems of the foreign tax credit.
A. THEORETIcAL ANALYSIS
The problem addressed in Revenue Ruling 76-508 is only one example
of a dilemma that often occurs in the administration of tax law: will the
Service accept the taxpayer's characterization of an event? Generally, if a
taxpayer's action is constrained by competitive market forces and his char-
acterization of an event is consistent with his action, there is no need for the
Service to challenge the taxpayer's decision--the taxpayer's self-interest
will produce a correct result.68 If market forces are not effective, however,
the taxpayer's self-interest will not necessarily produce the correct result
65. I.R.C. § 7805.
66. See K. DAviS, ADMIISTRATIvE LAW TExT 142 (3d ed. 1972). See generally B.
SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 140-65 (1976).
67. See K. DAVIs, supra note 66, at 142.
68. Section 162 of the Code provides a good example of this principle. This section per-
mits an employer to deduct a "reasonable allowance" for the salaries of his employees. I.R.C.
§ 162(a)(1). Theoretically, the Service could require a taxpayer to establish the reasonableness
of each salary deduction. In practice, the Service disputes few of these deductions. For the
majority of the deductions, the Service can rely upon the employer to pay no more than a
"reasonable" salary. The employer's self-interest in maximizing his profit and remaining in
business prompts him to give his employee the lowest salary acceptable to the employee. In
some situations, however, the employer's self-interest in maximizing his profit may be out-
weighed by other interests. For example, an employer in a close corporation may wish to run
the business at a breakeven point or even a loss and obtain large payments in salary, which are
in reality distributions of profit. Here, the Service cannot rely upon the market to produce a
reasonable salary, and it must examine the claimed deduction.
Petitioner is a close corporation and the same weight does not attach to salary al-
lowances voted by the directors of such a corporation as attaches in instances where
officers have little or no financial interest in the corporation. . . .Where a close cor-
poration is involved payments made to stockholder-officers as compensation for serv-
ices will be carefully scrutinized to determine whether they in fact constitute a
distribution of profits.
Builders Steel Co., 8 T.C.M. (CCH) 296, 301 (1949), rev'don otherground&, 179 F.2d 377 (8th
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and the Service may have to challenge the taxpayer's characterization, as in
a transaction between related entities.69 The foreign tax credit creates an-
other situation in which market forces do not provide appropriate con-
straints for the taxpayer. The taxpayer has no incentive-indeed, has a
disincentive--to contest a creditable foreign tax payment, since the com-
bined foreign and domestic tax payment will remain unchanged.70 Reve-
nue Ruling 76-508 apparently addresses itself to this failure of the market to
provide appropriate incentives.
Of course, the most effective incentive for the taxpayer to contest for-
eign tax payments would be the abolition of the foreign tax credit and the
foreign tax deduction.71 If the credit and deduction were abolished, the
Cir. 1950) (citations omitted). See also Capitol-Barg Dry Cleaning Co. v. Commissioner, 131
F.2d 712, 715 (6th Cir. 1942).
Similarly, the Tax Court, in determining the reasonableness of a salary authorized by a
corporation's board of directors, stated.
Where the record establishes [an independent board of directors] .... we have
been reluctant to substitute our judgment for that of the directors. We do not, how-
ever, regard petitioner's board as sufficiently independent to find that the compensa-
tion was fixed in an arm's length transaction.
Glenshaw Glass Co., 5 T.C.M. (CCH) 864, 866 (1946), arf'd per curiam, 175 F.2d 776 (3rd
Cir.), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 842 (1947). See also Kerrigan Iron Works, Inc. v. Commissioner,
17 T.C. 566 (1951); L. Schepp Co. v. Commissioner, 25 B.T.A. 419 (1932).
69. I.R.C. § 482. This section authorizes the Secretary to allocate income between related
entities to "prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income .... " See note 15 supra.
The Secretary must be able to scrutinize the pricing of goods sold between related entities
because the price is not determined by competitive market forces.
When the same persons control two or more entities they may cast their transactions
between those entities in any form that they desire. The restrainingforce of outside
interests is absent. Section 482 is designed "to prevent evasion of taxes" or distortion
of income caused by the form that these persons choose in casting their transactions.
South Texas Rice Warehouse v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 890, 898 n.19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1016 (1966)(emphasis added).
70. For the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that the taxpayer is risk neutral and
considers only the monetary costs and benefits of various actions. Considerations such as
establishing a precedent or contesting tax liability out of principle are not, therefore, within the
scope of this analysis. Also, the taxpayer is assumed always to attempt to maximize profit.
Under these assumptions, a taxpayer will seek a refund if and only if the expected benefits
from seeking the refund are greater than the costs. On the benefit side of the equation, ex-
pected benefit from seeking a refund is equal to the potential tax refund, R, discounted by the
probability of successfully obtaining the refund, p. On the cost side of the equation, a taxpayer
who receives a dollar-for-dollar credit for every tax payment has two costs associated with
obtaining a refund. First is the out-of-pocket cost, C, associated with contesting the tax liabil-
ity, including attorney and witness fees. Second is the cost, Cr, associated with the reduction
of his credit by an amount equal to the refund, R. Since the taxpayer will incur this credit cost
only if he successfully obtains a refund, this cost must also be multiplied by the probability of
successfully obtaining the refund, p. The taxpayer will only contest the foreign tax payment if:
C + [Cr * p] <R * p.
Since Cr is equal to , and the cost to contest, C, will always be positive, the costs must always
exceed the expected benefit. Therefore, the taxpayer will never have an incentive to contest
his foreign tax liability.
71. See note 74 infra.
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taxpayer generally would contest any foreign tax payment so long as the
cost of contest remained less than the expected tax savings.72 But abolition
would also subject the taxpayer to double taxation on all foreign income,
clearly an unacceptable outcome.73 Another possible solution would be to
abolish the credit but continue to allow a deduction for foreign tax pay-
ments.74 Unlike a credit, which removes all incentive to contest, a deduc-
tion removes only part of the incentive. If only a deduction were available,
the taxpayer would generally contest any foreign tax payment so long as the
sum of the cost of contest and the cost of losing the deduction are less than
tax savings.75 But this would still permit double taxation of a portion of
the taxpayer's foreign income.76
Although the IRS cannot eliminate the foreign tax credit or deduction,
it could develop a standard derived from one of these approaches to deter-
mine whether a foreign tax payment should be eligible for a credit. For
example, the standard for a credit might be the following: a foreign tax
payment shall be eligible for a credit if the taxpayer has contested all por-
tions of the payment that he would have contested if only a deduction were
available. To receive a foreign tax credit under this standard, the taxpayer
72. This standard assumes that the taxpayer is risk neutral and will consider only the
monetary costs and benefits of various actions. See note 70 supra. Without a credit cost, the
equation in note 70 supra becomes:
C < R * p.
So long as the cost of contest, C, is less than the expected benefit, R op, the taxpayer will gain
by attempting to obtain a refund.
73. For example, if the taxpayer earns $100 in the United Kingdom and is subject to a
200 tax there, he will pay $20 in U.K. tax. The same $100 of income is includible in his U.S.
taxable income, and if he is in a 50% tax bracket he will pay $50 in U.S. taxes. This produces
double taxation of $20-the amount by which his total tax payment exceeds his U.S. taxes.
74. The Code does contain a deduction provision for foreign taxes. I.R.C. § 164(a)(3).
The taxpayer must elect in each year whether to use the credit or the deduction, but he cannot
use both. Generally, the deduction is used only when the business will suffer a net operating
loss on its U.S. taxation for the year.
75. The taxpayer receiving a deduction for a foreign tax payment will compare the ex-
pected benefit from the tax refund, R ep, with the costs of obtaining the refund. The latter
include the cost to contest, C, and the cost associated with the loss of a deduction. Since the
taxpayer will incur this deduction cost only if he successfully obtains a refund, the amount of
the deduction, Dd, must be multiplied by p, the probability of obtaining the refund. The
amount of the deduction must also be multiplied by the taxpayer's effective U.S. tax rate, 1r, to
reflect the actual cost of losing a deduction. Thus, the taxpayer will contest the foreign tax
payment if
C + tr[Dd e p] <R e p.
Since the expected cost of losing the deduction will always be less than the expected refund,
and the cost of contest is always positive, there will often, but not always, be an incentive to
contest.
76. Taking the same figures and tax rates set out in note 73 supra, the taxpayer will receive
a $20 deduction for his tax payment to the United Kingdom. Since his effective U.S. tax rate
is 50%, this deduction will reduce his U.S. tax liability by $10. The taxpayer will pay a total of
$60 in tax-40 to the United States and $20 to the United Kingdom-resulting in double
taxation of $10.
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must contest foreign tax liability if the expected benefit is greater than the
sum of the costs of contesting the liability and the loss of the deduction. 77
This standard, however, may be difficult to apply to an individual case.
Although the possible tax refund will generally be known with certainty,
the other two factors in the equation are not as easily quantified. The Serv-
ice could alleviate the uncertainty of the "cost to contest" factor by prepar-
ing average contesting cost tables for each foreign country. It could
minimize uncertainty with regard to the "probability of success" factor by
arbitrarily requiring the use of a probability of ten percent unless the Serv-
ice can demonstrate special factors that would increase the probability.
These factors could be enumerated in regulations. 78
Even under this standard, however, there are two situations in which
the taxpayer has sufficient incentive to challenge foreign tax liability. In
these cases, there will be no need for the Service to evaluate the taxpayer's
decision in light of the deduction standard. The first occurs when a U.S.
taxpayer claims a section 902 indirect credit and the foreign corporation is
controlled by foreign shareholders. Since these foreign shareholders do not
receive a U.S. tax credit for the tax payments, market forces will cause them
to contest the liability if the expected benefit is greater than the costs. Sec-
ond, the IRS can rely upon the taxpayer's decision if his foreign tax pay-
ments exceed the section 904 maximum credit.79 If the amount of the
potential refund is less than the amount of the excess, the taxpayer will have
an incentive to contest his foreign tax liability, since he would not in any
case receive a credit for the payments. In both of these cases the market
provides an adequate incentive for the taxpayer to contest payments; thus,
the IRS need not examine the validity of the foreign tax payments.
B. SUGGESTED INTERPRETATION OF REVENUE RULING 76-508
Unless the Service revokes Revenue Ruling 76-508, the contribution
77. Expressed in an equation, this standard is:
C + tr [Dd * p] < R * p.
See note 75 supra. Alternatively, the standard for a credit might be: a foreign tax payment
shall be eligible for a credit if the taxpayer has contested all portions of the payment that he
would have contested if he had received neither a deduction nor a credit. Under this standard
the taxpayer must contest a foreign tax payment if the expected benefit is greater than the cost
of contesting:
C < R 0 p.
See note 72 supra.
78. An example of such a special factor would be a refund from the foreign tax authority
obtained by a similarly situated taxpayer. In such a case, the Service might find that the
probability of success in obtaining a refund had increased to 90%.
79. This analysis assumes that the taxpayer does not expect to claim a credit in future
years for these excess credits. See I.R.C. § 904(c); M. MooRE & R. BAGLEY, supra note 3, at
103.
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presumption looms over any taxpayer who seeks a foreign tax credit, leav-
ing the taxpayer to determine when the presumption will be raised and
what steps he must take to rebut it. The application of the theoretical anal-
ysis to Revenue Ruling 76-508 does not provide a simple answer or one that
the Service will necessarily follow. It does, however, provide guidance for
interpreting the ruling.
1. Contribution Presumption
Revenue Ruling 76-508's two conditions for invoking the contribution
presumption-possibility of reduction or refund in tax liability combined
with notice-should be interpreted so as to reduce the potential reach of the
presumption. First, the notice condition should be deemed met only if the
taxpayer has received "actual notice"80 of a possible refund or reduction in
foreign tax liability. This interpretation is necessary to duplicate the no-
credit situation, since even a taxpayer with a high incentive to contest a
payment would not do so unless he was aware of the possible refund. The
facts of the rulings are consistent with this interpretation. Revenue Ruling
76-508 stated that it was the proposed section 482 allocation letter itself that
put the taxpayer on notice, rather than the undertaking of the non-arm's-
length transaction. In Revenue Ruling 77-267, the IRS pointed to knowl-
edge of a similarly situated taxpayer's refund, not merely the existence of a
potential refund right, as the triggering event.
Second, a "possibility of a refund or reduction of tax liability" should
occur only when the taxpayer would have contested the tax liability but for
the existence of a credit. Use of the deduction standard s' would place the
taxpayer on the same footing as one seeking a deduction. This standard
would provide that a possibility of refund or reduction would occur when
the expected tax saving was greater than the sum of the cost to obtain the
lowest level of administrative review and the expected loss of the tax benefit
provided by a deduction for the foreign tax payment.8 2 Thus, Revenue
Ruling 76-508's contribution presumption would become more consistent
with considerations of law and policy. The policies of preserving the integ-
rity of the U.S. Treasury and of removing the credit's disincentive to con-
test8 3 both support this standard.84
80. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
81. See notes 72-77 supra and accompanying text.
82. See notes 75 & 77 supra.
83. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
84. Although the facts of Rev. RuL 76-508 and Rev. Rul. 77-267 do not specify the
amount of the refund, the cost to contest, or the probability of success, it is likely that there
would be a large enough expected refund to prompt a taxpayer who receives only a deduction
for the tax payment to contest the tax payment. In Rev. Rul. 76-508, the § 482 allocation may
create a very high probability of obtaining a refund of the foreign taxes paid on that income.
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2. Procedural Rebuttal
Assuming that, using the deduction standard, the contribution pre-
sumption seems likely to be raised, the next question is what procedural
steps will rebut the presumption. Revenue Ruling 76-508 requires exhaus-
tion of "effective and practicable administrative remedies." Again, using
the deduction standard, the exhaustion of effective and practicables5 reme-
dies will occur when the expected tax saving is less than the sum of the cost
of administrative contest and the expected loss of a tax deduction. The cost
of administratively contesting the tax liability should be determined for
each level of administrative review.8 6 The taxpayer win have exhausted
his administrative remedies when the aggregate cost of proceeding to the
next level is greater than or equal to the discounted tax savings.87
In addition, to rebut the contribution presumption, the taxpayer may
have to exhaust his remedies under the competent authority procedure.88
Similarly, in Rev. Rul. 77-267, the very existence of a similarly situated taxpayer who peti-
tioned for and obtained a refund would indicate a high probability of success. It appears,
then, that in these two cases the IRS may properly have raised the contribution presumption.
85. The Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 require the use of "the best
practicable control technology currently available." 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b)(1)(A)(1976). In CPC
Int'l, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1329 (8th Cir. 1976), the court defined practicable to include the
notion of cost. "[The term 'practicable' is to limit the use of available technology only where
the additional technology necessary to achieve a marginal level of effluent reduction is wholly
out of proportion to the cost realized." Id. at 1341 (citations omitted).
86. A simple example will illustrate this determination. Assume the following: the
amount of tax refund in question is $5,000; the probability of obtaining a refund is 25%; the
taxpayer's effective U.S. tax rate is 50%; and the legal cost of seeking administrative remedies
is
Inform al request ..................................................... $ 50
Private letter ruling ................................................... 100
H earing ............................................................. 800
Further review proceedings ............................................ 1,000
The expected tax refund (amount of tax refund * probability of success) will be ($5,000) (.25)
= $1,250. Taking into account the effective tax rate of 50%, the cost of the deduction will be
(.50)($1,250) = $625.
The taxpayer should pursue his refund until the aggregate cost of the next step is greater
than the expected tax refund of $1,250. In the example, this would occur after the private
letter ruling stage, when the aggregate cost of contest (legal costs + cost of deduction) will be
$50 + $100 + $625 = $775. Appealing the private letter ruling would thus produce an aggre-
gate cost of $1,575, which is greater than the expected tax refund of $1,250.
87. A recent Tax Court case, Schering Corp. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. No. 46, [1978] TAX
Or. REP. (CCH) 34,929, is consistent with this approach. The IRS wished to deny the tax-
payer's foreign tax credit because he had failed to exhaust all effective and practicable admin-
istrative remedies in pursuing a reduction of foreign tax liability. The taxpayer had requested
and received a foreign government private letter ruling stating that he was liable for the tax.
The court held that the receipt of the letter ruling exhausted all practicable and effective ad-
ministrative remedies, since any further administrative contest would be "futile." Id. at 2249-
50. Although the court did not quantify its analysis, it appears to have determined in effect
that the probability of success was so slight as to make the expected tax refund extremely
small.
88. If there is no treaty providing for a competent authority procedure between the United
REVENUE RULING 76-508
Resort to competent authority in addition to foreign administrative reme-
dies should be necessary in only two situations. First, if the foreign statute
of limitations for contesting tax liability has tolled, administrative relief in
the foreign country may not be open to the taxpayer at the time he becomes
aware of the reasonable possibility of a tax refund. In such a case, the
taxpayer should avail himself of the competent authority procedure if the
sum of the cost of petitioning the authority and the expected loss of the tax
benefit from the deduction for the foreign tax payment is less than the ex-
pected refund. Second, if the taxpayer-after exhausting the administra-
tive relief in the foreign country-is unable to obtain a refund, he should be
required to seek the assistance of competent authority only if the additional
cost of seeking the assistance, plus the prior costs of administratively con-
testing and the expected deduction cost, remain less than the expected tax
refund.
CONCLUSION
Recent IRS revenue rulings appear to have limited the availability of
the foreign tax credit by raising a presumption that the taxpayer has made a
contribution rather than a foreign tax payment in certain circumstances.
The rulings also point to the methods a taxpayer may use to rebut this pre-
sumption. But the Service has failed to provide specific guidelines for de-
termining when it is likely to challenge a payment or when the taxpayer has
successfully rebutted the presumption once it is raised. At present, the rul-
ings set requirements that are needlessly uncertain and legally infirm. To
cure these defects, the Service should revoke the rulings and promulgate
regulations clarifying the circumstances that will raise and rebut this pre-
sumption by setting a standard that is both legally sound and easily applica-
ble.
David A Clarke
States and the foreign country where the tax payment was made, the requirement to exhaust
remedies under competent authority does not apply. Letter Rul. No. 7838063, [19781 IRS
LETrER RULING RnP. (CCH) (June 22, 1978).
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